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Abstract
We examine how a multinational’s choice to centralize or de-centralize its
decision structure is aﬀected by country tax diﬀerentials. Within a simple model
that emphasizes the multiple conflicting roles of transfer prices in MNEs — here,
as a strategic pre-commitment device and a tax manipulation instrument —, we
show that decentralization is preferred in case of small tax diﬀerentials, whereas
centralization can be more profitable, when tax diﬀerentials are large. In essence,
the organizational flexibility of MNEs is triggered by the scope for tax minimiza-
tion. Our analysis allows for both commitment and non-commitment to transfer
prices, and for alternative modes of competition.
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1 Introduction
This paper explores possible links between de-centralization decisions in multinational
enterprises (MNEs) and diﬀerences in tax rates in the countries in which they operate.
It establishes that whereas without tax diﬀerences there may be strategic reasons for
delegating decisions to decentral levels, suﬃciently large tax diﬀerences may lead MNEs
to opt for centralization instead.
As it is well known, a central authority in a MNE has by definition joint profit
maximization as its goal. That definition, however, says nothing on whether all deci-
sions in such vertically integrated companies should be taken at the central authority
level. Actually, it is widely recognized that some decisions should be delegated to a de-
centralized authority level. The theoretical underpinnings of this so-called delegation
principle are described in the industrial organization (IO) literature, where a princi-
pal may benefit from hiring an agent and giving him/her the incentive to maximize
something other than the welfare of the principal.1
A multinational enterprise is an integrated, global profit maximizing company
and as such it also faces the choice of delegating some authority to its subsidiaries.
Whether it does so or not depends on institutional and structural issues that are
specific to the MNE activity that we focus on. For example, for the case of R&D
activities, there exists a large literature that both documents and explains the extent
of de-centralization that takes place within MNEs.2 Our aim here is to draw attention to
the importance of corporate tax diﬀerences across countries as determinants of MNEs’
delegation decisions.
The implications of corporate tax diﬀerences are a central theme in the public
finance literature on MNEs. In that literature the main focus is on the ability of MNEs
to use transfer prices in order to shift profits to low tax jurisdictions.3 The assumption
1See e.g. Vickers (1985), Sklivas (1987), Fershtmann and Judd (1987), and Katz (1991).
2See e.g. Grandstrand et al. (1992), Almeida (1996), Papanastasiu and Pearce (2005) for empirical
evidence, and Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000), Sanna-Randaccio and Veugelers (2005) for theoret-
ical considerations.
3While Weichenrieder (1996) studies European multinationals and their transfer pricing behavior,
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in that literature is that transfer prices are only used for that one purpose, viz. as a
tax-minimizing instrument. However, as we noted above, the industrial organization
literature has stressed issues of delegation within MNEs. In particular, transfer prices
have been seen as instruments for obtaining strategic advantages vis-a-vis competitors.
If one incorporates such delegation issues, transfer prices may have conflicting roles
within the MNE. In such a situation, the centralization vs. de-centralization choice of
theMNEwill have to be reconsidered with the aim of solving the problems related to the
conflicting roles of transfer prices. In doing so, the centralization vs. de-centralization
choice becomes a function of the tax diﬀerential. As far as we are aware, this implication
of tax diﬀerentials has not been noticed before in the literature.
In presenting our argument as clearly as possible, we choose a simple model
where the absence of tax diﬀerentials across countries (or of taxation per se) leads
the MNE to delegate some authority to its subsidiaries. While the subsidiaries are
assigned the authority to choose output and sales levels, the MNE centrally decides
the (transfer) price a subsidiary will have to pay for its input purchases. Assuming that
the subsidiary operates in a market with Cournot competition, such a decision structure
will lead to a higher market share in the subsidiary’s market, and thus to higher joint
profits. This is exactly the essence of the delegation principle: By introducing a pre-
commitment device (here, a low transfer price), the centralized authority can induce
the de-centralized authority to take global profit maximizing actions.
Tax diﬀerentials, however, can alter the story: If the subsidiary faces suﬃciently
higher taxes, then earning high (pre-tax) profits in that country due to a strategically
set low transfer price will not be profit-maximizing for the MNE anyway. A high and not
a low transfer price is needed to shift profits out of the high-tax country. But the high
transfer price then inevitably interferes with the market share game of the subsidiary.
Consequently, a reconsideration of the delegation decision is called for, and possibly
the resolution is centralization in lieu of de-centralization. In fact, it is straightforward
to show that the outcome of the delegation decision becomes an endogenous function
Hines (1999) surveys the literature on U.S. multinational behavior. Gresik (2001) provides a compre-
hensive survey of the literature.
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of the tax diﬀerential. In our example, small tax diﬀerentials foster de-centralization,
while large tax diﬀerentials (with the subsidiary taxed more heavily) will lead to cen-
tralization.
Having presented our argument in its simplest form, we proceed by showing
that the decentralization choice is not necessarily contingent on pre-commitment of
the transfer price. Recognizing how easy it is for MNEs to alter their transfer price,
an alternative sequence of actions has the MNE first deciding on decentralizing, then
letting the diﬀerent entities choose their output levels, and finally choosing the transfer
price that maximizes global profits. We show that for some tax diﬀerentials this strategy
gives the highest profits. Thus, not only can the MNE select whether to centralize its
decisions or not; it may also be able to choose how to decentralize.
A few previous papers have recognized the multiple roles of transfer prices and
their relationship with taxes. Mintz and Elizur (1996) model the transfer price both as
a tax-minimizing instrument and as an instrument to influence the decisions of a self-
interested manager in the subsidiary company. However, by imposing a transfer pricing
rule, i.e. by fixing the transfer price to a level acceptable to the tax authorities, they
focus on the second attribute of transfer prices and how tax competition aﬀects the
MNE. More closely related papers are Schjelderup and Sørgaard (1997) and Nielsen
et al. (2003), where the transfer price takes on the same dual role as in this paper,
i.e. both as a strategic and as a tax-minimizing instrument. However, in both papers
delegation is taken as given and is not a matter of choice. Here we endogenize that
choice.
A central premise in our analysis is that MNEs do not hold two sets of books
where diﬀerent transfer prices are used (sometimes even on the same transaction) in
order to save tax payments and provide managerial incentives. Clearly, two transfer
prices assigned to solve two goals would do as least as good as having only one transfer
price at disposal.4 In some countries the practice of two sets of books is illegal, while
in some countries two sets of books are legal. In the latter case one set of books would
4See Baldenius et al. (2004) and Hyde and Choe (2005) for the superiority of two transfer prices.
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be provided for tax accounting and the another for internal resource allocation. The
idea that MNEs may assign one transfer price to provide managerial incentives and one
to save tax payments, however, does not fit with reality. ”Most MNEs insist on using
one set of prices both for simplicity and in order to avoid the possibility that multiple
transfer prices become evidence in any disputes with the tax authorities.” (Baldenius et
al. 2004, p.592). This statement is supported by a series of studies on multinationals
and transfer pricing behavior.5
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we set up our basic
model featuring a MNE operating in two countries. The parent company ships goods to
the subsidiary which faces competition from a local producer. Decisions as to outputs
can either be taken at the central level or at the decentral levels. In the latter case, the
choice of transfer price has a bearing on the terms of competition in the subsidiary’s
country. Analyzing both centralization and de-centralization we identify how the choice
between the two depends on country tax diﬀerences. Section 3 considers modifications
of our model having to do with commitment to the transfer price and the form of
competition. Conclusions are found in section 4.
2 The basic model
Consider a MNE that operates in two countries: country A, where the parent firm is
located, and country B, where the subsidiary firm is located. The parent produces a
product that is sold directly to the consumers in country A, and is also sold to the
5Czechowicz et al. (1982) reports that 89% of U.S. MNEs use the same transfer price for internal
and external purposes. Even if the practice of two sets of books has increased since 1982, Eden (1998,
p.295-299) finds that, at least for merchandise trade flows, MNEs do not keep two sets of books. An
even more recent survey by Ernst & Young (2003) indicates that over 80% of parent companies use
a single set of transfer prices for management and tax purposes. The report adds that ”alignment of
transfer prices with management views of the business can enhance the defensibility of the transfer
prices, ease the administrative burden, and add to the eﬀectiveness of the transfer pricing program. In
fact, in many countries management accounts are the primary starting point in the determination of
tax liability and diﬀerence between tax and management accounts are closely scrutinized” (p.17).
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consumers in country B through the subsidiary firm, which here takes the form of a
retailer. The market in country A is assumed to be monopolistic, while the market in
country B is characterized by Cournot competition between the subsidiary and a local
firm.6 To simplify, without bearing on qualitative results, we assume that demand in
both countries is linear and all production costs are constant and normalized to zero.
Based on these assumptions the firms’ profits (absent taxes) are the following:7
ΠA = (1−QA)QA + qQB (1)
ΠB = (1−QB −Q∗B)QB − qQB (2)
ΠB
∗
= (1−QB −Q∗B)Q∗B (3)
The quantity sold in country i (i = A,B) is denoted byQi, while an asterisk (∗) denotes
variables for the local competitor in country B. The transfer price is denoted by q. As
is seen, the parent firm has revenues from selling directly to country A’s consumers
and to the subsidiary in country B (while the costs of producing QA and QB are zero
by assumption). The subsidiary’s revenue depends on the sales of the local competitor,
while its costs are determined by the transfer price which it has to pay to the parent
firm. Finally, the foreign local firm has revenues from selling in its local market (while
the cost of producing Q∗B is zero).
Accounting for taxes, the MNE maximizes after-tax global profits, while the
local competitor maximizes its after-tax local profits ΠB
∗
. In each country there is
a company tax (tA, tB) that falls on the profits of the firms that operate within the
country, i.e. taxation is based on the separate accounting system.8 It is also assumed
that in the case where the transfer price deviates from its true (arm’s length) value of
6This set-up is the simplest possible to portray the strategic considerations involved in setting
transfer prices. None of the qualitative results that we present here depends on the Cournot assumption
(except for the sign of the transfer price under de-centralization).
7Since for our purpose there is no need for general intercept and slope parameters in demand
expressions, we take all of them to be unity.
8In addition, we assume that the exemption principle of international taxation is in force, so that the
subsidiary’s income is not liable to tax in the parent’s country. In essence, this requires the subsidiary
to be a separate legal entity.
6
zero, the MNE faces a non-tax-deductible transfer pricing cost.9 We assume that this
cost is quadratic and based on the actual diﬀerence between the chosen price and the
true price (which is zero here), viz. q2/2.10 That is, if the transfer price is not zero, the
MNE incurs costs that are an increasing function of the deviation from zero.11
We proceed by examining, in turn, a centralized and a de-centralized decision
structure of the MNE. The option of centralization implies that the MNE chooses
both its transfer price, output and sales simultaneously (subsection 2.1). We derive
the endogenous variables and find the centralized MNE’s profits as a function of tax
rates tA and tB. We next examine the de-centralization option (subsection 2.2), where
the MNE chooses centrally only its transfer price, while its entities choose output and
sales decentrally. Again we derive the endogenous variables and find the de-centralized
profits as functions of tA and tB. We finally compare the MNE’s profits in the two
equilibria (subsection 2.3) and determine the eﬀect of the tax diﬀerential on the MNE’s
organizational structure, viz. centralization or de-centralization.
2.1 Centralized choices
This is the case where the MNE centrally chooses all its decision variables in order
to maximize after-tax global profits (ΠC , where superscript C denotes centralized). In
9These costs can be thought of as real resource costs that the MNE pays to experts (lawyers,
accountants) in order to argue to authorities for the particular level of the transfer price chosen. One
can also perceive these costs as an expected penalty that tax authorities impose on distorted transfer
pricing.
10Including a convex transfer price is necessary in order to obtain an internal solution for the transfer
price (see Kant, 1988, and Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000).
11One might argue that transfer pricing costs/penalties should depend not only on the extent of
transfer pricing distortion, i.e. the diﬀerence between q and 0, but also on the volume of the intra-firm
transactions QB and/or on the actual tax rates ti. The implications of diﬀerent transfer price penalty
schemes are an interesting topic in itself that has only rarely been touched upon; see Nielsen et al.
(2006). Here, however, alternative formulations of the cost/penalty scheme have no qualitative eﬀect
on the issue which we examine. Thus, we choose to proceed with the simple quadratic transfer pricing
cost function.
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doing so, the MNE takes into account the Cournot competition in country B and the
cost of transfer-price distortion. The maximization problems of the centralized MNE
and its competitor in country B are:
max
q,QA,QB
ΠC = (1− tA)ΠA + (1− tB)ΠB −
1
2
q2
max
Q∗B
ΠB
∗
= (1− tB)ΠB
∗
By deriving the first order conditions and manipulating them we get the equilibrium
values for the choice variables:
QA =
1
2
(4)
QB =
1− tB
3(1− tB)− 2(tB − tA)2
(5)
Q∗B =
(1− tB)− (tB − tA)2
3(1− tB)− 2(tB − tA)2
(6)
q = (1− tB)(tB − tA)
3(1− tB)− 2(tB − tA)2
(7)
It is immediately seen that when taxes are equal (tA = tB), the choice variables
take on the anticipated values, i.e. the transfer price will be set equal to the true price
(q = 0) and QB = Q∗B = 13 , the standard expressions for Cournot duopoly quantities.12
However, when tA 6= tB, the tax-manipulation incentive enters. Starting from equal
tax levels we can show that dQBdtB
¯¯¯
tA=tB
< 0 and dqdtB
¯¯¯
tA=tB
> 0, i.e. when taxes become
higher in the foreign country (B), then the MNE will reduce sales in that country by
overinvoicing in the internal transaction.
Evaluating total centralized profits ΠC = (1 − tA)ΠA + (1 − tB)ΠB − 12q2 at
the equilibrium choices QA, QB, q gives:
ΠC =
(1− tA)
4
+
(1− tB)2
£
2(1− tB)− (tB − tA)2
¤
2
£
3(1− tB)− 2 (tB − tA)2
¤2 (8)
For future reference notice that for tA = tB = t, we get ΠC = (1− t)(14 +
1
9
).
12The intuition behind setting q = 0 is easy to grasp when one notices that the parent firm avoids
double marginalization issues by charging the retailer a wholesale price equal to the marginal cost of
production.
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2.2 De-centralized choices
We now consider the case where the MNE chooses its transfer price centrally, but
decentralizes output decisions to its entities. Here we assume that decentralization is
implemented by a pre-commitment of the transfer price.13
To depict the benefits of transfer price pre-commitment, we solve backwards
by considering output decisions given a fixed transfer price. From the maximization
problems maxQA Π
A,maxQB ΠB,maxQ∗B Π
B∗, where the profits are defined in (1)-(3),
we derive the standard monopoly, respectively Cournot duopoly sales choices: QA =
1
2
, QB = 1−2q3 , Q∗B =
1+q
3
. We see that a drop in the transfer price q will lead to an
increase in the subsidiary’s output and a fall in output of the competitor.
Moving to the choice of the transfer price q, the (headquarters of the) MNE
maximizes ΠDC = (1− tA)ΠA + (1− tB)ΠB − 12q2 with respect to q, and gets:
q = 4tB − 3tA − 1
13 + 8tB − 12tA
(9)
It is easy to see that in the absence of tax diﬀerentials, tA = tB = t, we have
q = t−1
13−4t < 0, i.e. the strategic delegation eﬀect alone leads to underinvocing. This is
exactly what we should expect in our Stackelberg-Cournot equilibrium.14 Setting a low
transfer price makes the subsidiary sell a larger quantity. The competitor anticipates
this and its best response is to limit its own sales.15
Calculating the de-centralized profits ΠDC using the above information gives:
ΠDC =
1− tA
4
+
1− tB
9
+
(4tB − 3tA − 1)2
18 (13 + 8tB − 12tA)
(10)
13However, later on in section 3.1 we show that this may not be necessary.
14This strategic delegation eﬀect is absent in the centralized case. Due to it, we expect the de-
centralized transfer price to generally be lower than the centralized transfer price, even in the face of
tax diﬀerences. This is indeed the case in our simulations below.
15By observing the low transfer price the local competitior anticipates the subsidiary’s production
decision and, thus, reduces its own quantity. Observability of the transfer price may seem like a strong
assumption. However import prices, for example, are public information in many countries due to
the calculation of duties and tariﬀs. Furthermore, the MNE has an incentive to make this type of
information publicly available. Katz (1991) discusses observability issues in delegation.
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For tB = tA = t, we get ΠDC = (1− t)
¡
1
4
+ 1
9
¢
+ (t−1)
2
18(13−4t) .
2.3 Comparing centralized and de-centralized profits
For equal taxes it is straightforward to see that the de-centralized global profits are
always higher than centralized profits. In particular, ΠDC −ΠC = (t−1)
2
18(13−4t) > 0 for t ∈
(0, 1). This is exactly as expected: without any tax saving incentive, pre-commitment
to a low transfer price provides a credible incentive to expand sales in the subsidiary’s
market, and thus win the market-share game in that country. Thus, in the absence
of tax diﬀerences, pre-commitment of transfer prices under a de-centralized decision
system is more profitable than a centralized decision system.16
However, for unequal taxes, the result of the comparison becomes ambiguous
and a function of the specific tax levels in the two countries. The incentive to save
tax payments may work against the strategic eﬀect of transfer prices, in which case it
is not obvious that the firm should make use of its delegation opportunity. A simple
numerical example is suﬃcient for illustrating and providing the main intuition.
Setting tB = 0.3 in (8) and (10) and allowing tA (’tax’ in the figure) to vary,
we obtain the following picture:
16Clearly, this result rests on the fact that there is oligopolistic competition in the foreign country.
Altering the competition assumption can certainly eliminate the result, making centralized decisions
at least as profitable as de-centralized decisions.
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Figure 1: Centralized vs. de-centralized profits
In figure 1 there appear 3 curves, but initially we shall focus only on two of
them namely the bold(/red) and the thin(/green) curve. The bold curve depicts the de-
centralized profits, while the thin curve depicts the centralized profits. The two profit
functions are equal for t∗A ' 0.208. For tA < t∗A, centralized profits are higher than
de-centralized profits, while the opposite holds for tA > t∗A.
To explain what is happening, note first that, as discussed above, equal taxes
entail that the MNE always chooses a de-centralized decision structure. However, if the
tax in the subsidiary’s home country is higher than the tax in the parent’s country,
i.e. tB = 0.3 > tA, the MNE will want to overinvoice in order to save tax payments
abroad. Thus, the tax saving incentive dictates a high transfer price, while the strategic
delegation eﬀect favors a low transfer price. As tA falls, the desire to save tax payments
strengthens; unfortunately, doing so interferes with the market-share game which the
subsidiary is involved in. The result is that at some point it becomes unprofitable to
use the transfer price as an instrument to implement de-centralized decisions. In our
example, this point is reached at tA ' 0.208. Below this tax level it is more profitable
for the MNE to exclusively focus on saving tax payments, and the preferred way to
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accomplish this is to eliminate the de-centralization option and instead choose sales in
a centralized manner. In essence, the problem of the conflicting roles of the transfer
price is resolved by moving all decisions to the central level.
3 Extensions of the model
Having presented our main point in the most direct way, we now examine the influence
of some of our assumptions.
3.1 The non-commitment case
In describing the decentralized case we assumed that the MNE will pre-commit its
transfer price, arguing that it is this pre-commitment that creates strategic delegation
gains. In essence, we postulated the following sequence of events: (i) the MNE decides
whether to decentralize or not; (ii) in case of decentralization, the parent chooses the
transfer price; (iii) output levels are chosen.
However, choosing a decentralized structure does not necessarily imply pre-
commitment to a transfer price. The company may prefer the choice of its transfer price
to be its ultimate decision — or it may simply be unable to pre-commit to a transfer
price at an earlier stage. In other words, the following sequence of events may be more
relevant: (i) decision as to whether to decentralize or not; (ii) choice of output levels;
(iii) (if relevant) selection of the transfer price. We label this case the non-commitment
case. Clearly, not committing to a particular transfer price before decentralized units
choose output levels can be defended by the relative ease with which MNEs can alter
their transfer prices. More important, we will show that this non-commitment case
can (for some tax diﬀerentials) also be time-consistent in the sense of being the most
profitable strategy for a decentralized MNE.
Backward induction is again employed. The transfer price is set to maximize
ΠDC = (1 − tA)[(1 − QA)QA + qQB] + (1 − tB)[(1 − QB − Q∗B)QB − qQB − 12q2] for
given output choices. The result is q = (tB − tA)QB. Next, solving for the outputs and
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taking into account how the transfer price subsequently will be set, yields:
QA =
1
2
, QB =
1
3 + 4(tB − tA)
, Q∗B =
1 + 2(tB − tA)
3 + 4(tB − tA)
which in turn gives:
q = tB − tA
3 + 4(tB − tA)
(11)
It is easy to see that in the absence of tax diﬀerentials the transfer price will
be zero and the quantities will take the standard Cournot values (equal to a 1/3). This
is exactly the same as in the centralized case analyzed above and thus the profits in the
two cases (decentralization with no transfer-price commitment and centralization) will
also be the same. Given our results in the previous section, we can thus conclude that
when there are no tax diﬀerentials, the MNE benefits from pre-committing its transfer
price, if possible.
However, in the presence of tax diﬀerentials things become less transparent.
We calculate the decentralized profits in this non-commitment case,17 and we plot the
result in Figure 1 as the dashed(/brown) curve. Comparison reveals that there is an
area of tax diﬀerences where it is in fact more profitable for the MNE not to commit
to a transfer price, viz. when the tax manipulating eﬀect is strong (due to a large tax
diﬀerences) and supports the strategic delegation eﬀect – in our example this will be
the case when tA > 0.38.
Thus, for the specific numerical example that we present, there are three strate-
gies that the MNE can follow in pursuing profit maximization: (i) centralize all decisions
(when the tax manipulation eﬀect is strong and in conflict with the strategic delega-
tion eﬀect), (ii) decentralize its output decisions by pre-commiting to its transfer price
(when the tax manipulation eﬀect is weak), and (iii) decentralize its output decisions
without any commitment of its transfer price (when the tax manipulation eﬀect is
strong and does not conflict with the strategic delegation eﬀect)
17The form is
ΠDC−NC = 13− 16t
3
A + 28tB + 10t2B + t2A(42 + 32tB)− tA(41 + 52tB + 16t2B)
4 (3 + 4tB − 4tA)2
13
To understand why non-commitment of transfer prices can be advantageous,
we plot the transfer prices for the above three cases, i.e. eq. (7), (9) and (11):
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Figure 2: Centralized vs. de-centralized transfer prices
As expected, the pre-committed transfer price (bold/red curve) is always below
the centralized transfer price (thin/green curve), indicating that de-centralization with
pre-commitment helps the MNE to become aggressive in the market share game.18
Moreover, the non-committed transfer price (the dashed/brown curve) lies in be-
tween the centralized and the pre-commited transfer price.19 Thus, in general the
non-committed transfer price is less aggressive than the committed transfer price. Ap-
parently, when the tax manipulation eﬀect is in the same direction as the strategic
delegation eﬀect, the non-committed transfer price may be superior at balancing the
two eﬀects as compared to the pre-committed transfer price (which mainly pursues the
strategic delegation eﬀect).
18Compare with our conjecture in fn. 13.
19As we have shown, the de-centralised not-committed transfer price is equal to the centralised
transfer price when taxes are equal (tA = tB = 0.3).
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3.2 On competition assumptions
Here we briefly explain how alternative assumptions with respect to the competition
in the foreign country aﬀect the above results.
First note that if the duopoly in the foreign country were characterized by
Bertand competition and diﬀerentiated products, then the MNE would have an in-
centive to pre-commit to a high transfer price.20 The intuition is that the Bertrand
competition is too intense to start with, and a high transfer price enables a higher
price for the subsidiary’s product (as well as that of the competitor).21 A high transfer
price will not interfere with the tax saving incentive as long as the tax in the foreign
country is higher than the tax in the parent’s country. When namely tB > tA, the two
concerns of the MNE are not in conflict with each other, and de-centralization is clearly
to be preferred. The conflict, however, will arise if tB < tA, where tax saving calls for
a low transfer price, while strategic delegation requires a high transfer price. Beyond
a certain critical value of the tax diﬀerential, centralized decisions will become more
profitable than decentralized decisions. A figure similar to figure 1 can also be drawn
for this case. It will feature a profit curve for de-centralization which will lie above the
profit curve for centralization for all values of tA to the left of some intersection point
at a value t∗A, which itself lies to the right of tB = 0.3.
Second, the number of competitors in the foreign market also has an intuitive
eﬀect on our results. Assuming a larger and fixed number of firms in country B, or
a free entry and exit Cournot game, will reduce the profits that strategic delegation
can provide to the MNE’s subsidiary. Reducing these profits weakens the strategic
delegation incentive, making it less worthwhile to use transfer prices for that purpose.
Centralization, allowing a clear focus on tax manipulation, will therefore be preferred
for a bigger range of tax diﬀerentials.22
20For brevity, the case of non-commitment is not analysed here.
21If the two companies’ products were homogeneous, and they competed in Bertrand fashion, then
there would of course be no scope for any strategic motive for setting the transfer price.
22Similar intuition can be applied to the case of asymetric production costs. Further, the importance
of the strategic transfer price motive and thus the precise break-even point between centralization and
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To sum up, de-centralization allows the MNE to aggressively pursue competi-
tion in the subsidiary’s market, but only halfheartedly manipulate its tax payments.
Centralization allows full devotion to tax manipulation, but does not enable strategic
pre-commitment in the subsidiary’s market. The size of tax diﬀerentials will determine
how important it will be to pursue a tax saving strategy, and what will be the most
appropriate decision structure of the MNE.
4 Conclusions
A MNE’s choice of organization of its decision making is complex and depends on
a host of considerations. The theoretical guidelines on this issue are laid out in the
principal-agent theory of the firm, where it is widely recognized that de-centralization
of decision-making oﬀers a number of advantages to the firm (among these the strategic
delegation argument). In this paper we focus on this de-centralization choice, but we
draw attention to an additional issue, namely the exploitation of international tax
diﬀerentials, which is specific to MNEs as they per definition operate in diﬀerent tax
jurisdictions.
We argue that tax diﬀerentials can have an important bearing on whether a
MNE chooses to make all its decisions at the central level or not. By emphasizing
the centralization vs. de-centralization decision as a choice that the MNE must make
in its eﬀorts to maximize profits, we show that while small tax diﬀerentials favor de-
centralized decisions, large tax diﬀerentials may render centralized decision-making
preferable. In modeling this issue, we choose to focus on the conflicting roles which
transfer prices can have within a MNE, and on how centralizing decision-making can
help overcome these dilemmas.
We acknowledge that two interpretations of decentralization are possible, viz.
decentralization with commitment and without commitment regarding the transfer
price. It turns out that pre-committing transfer prices is a very aggressive policy that
de-centralization obviously hinges on the exact demand conditions in country B.
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mainly addresses the strategic delegation eﬀect. Given that the MNE also desires to
pursue tax manipulation, not committing to the transfer price can be more profitable
to the MNE, if the gains from tax minimization are large (the tax diﬀerential is large).
Thus, the MNE must decide not only whether to decentralize or not, but also when to
determine the transfer price.23
Finally, whether or not MNEs in reality select their organizational structure in
response to tax diﬀerentials is an empirical issue that is certainly worth pursuing. Our
theoretical arguments (albeit based on a number of assumptions) entail that MNEs may
be less likely to delegate decision-making to subsidiaries which are located in countries
with either very high or very low tax rates, depending on the nature of competition for
local market shares.
Acknowledgements: We thank seminar participants in Copenhagen, AS-
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especially Delia Ionascu for constructive comments.
23Presupposing that commitment of the transfer price is possible.
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